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ARGUMENT IN REPLY
L

THE COURT SHOULD ASSUME THE CORRECTNESS OF THE
JUDGMENT IN LIGHT OF GILLMOR'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH
UTAH R. APP. P. 24(A)(7).
Defendants argued that the trial court's judgment should be affirmed due to

Gillmor's failure to comply with Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(7). Specifically, Defendants
noted Gillmor's complete failure to provide any citation to the record for her purported
facts. In response, Gillmor admits the omission, but attempts to rectify the same by
providing a revised version of her brief as an addendum to her Reply Brief. This is
improper.
Citation to the record is not simply a procedural nicety but is mandatory under
Rule 24(a)(7). "Failure to conform to these requirements may carry serious
consequences." Beehive Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 2004 UT 18, ^[12, 89 P.3d 131.
"For example, 'briefs which are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on
motion or sua sponte by the court.'" Id.,% 12 (quoting Utah R. App. P. 24(j)).
Rather than seek leave to amend her brief, affording Defendants the opportunity to
respond, Gillmor simply included the required citations in an exhibit to her Reply Brief.
This is not compliant with Rule 24(a)(7). The reason that issues raised for the first time
by an appellant in the reply brief "are considered waived and will not be considered" is
"to prevent the resulting unfairness to the respondent if an argument or issue was first
raised in the reply brief and the respondent had no opportunity to respond." Brown v.
Glover, 2000 UT 89, K 23, 16 P.3d 540 (citations omitted). Gillmor's attempt to
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circumvent the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be condoned. In this case,
Gillmor's conduct effectively precludes the Appellees from pointing out the inaccuracy
of many of the statements made in her Opening brief. Established appellate law dictates
that the Court should assume the correctness of the judgment. See Koulis v. Standard Oil
Co., 746 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Phillips v. Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108,
1109-10 (Utah Ct.App. 1995).1
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT
SANCTIONS SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED AGAINST GILLMOR.
Gillmor argues that the trial court correctly denied Defendant's motion for Rule 11

sanctions as to Gillmor because there was no showing of improper purpose or subjective
bad faith. See Gillmor's Reply Brief, p. 6-7. Gillmor continues to misapprehend the
elements of a Rule 11 motion.
In regard to Rule 11 motions, "Subjective intentions are essentially irrelevant; the
determination of whether the rule has been violated is made on an objective basis."
Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 171 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (emphasis added).
Instead, the Rule "'requires some inquiry into both the facts and the law before the paper
is filed; the level of inquiry is tested against a standard of reasonableness under the
circumstances.'" Id. at 170 (quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1333 at 177 (1987 Supp.)). "This objective approach allows sanctions to be
*In any event, the record citations included in Gillmor's Reply Brief are not very helpful
to the Court, as Gillmor cites mostly to various allegations contained in her Complaint,
which allegations, as set forth in Defendants' Opening Brief, are without basis. See
Defendants' Opening Brief, pp. 9-10.
267268vl
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imposed in a greater range of circumstances than did the pre-amendment, subjective
'bad faith' approach." Id. (emphasis added). See also Barnard v. Sutliff 846 P.2d 1229,
1236 Utah, 1992 ("the reasonableness of an attorneys view of the law is not a subjective
standard.... In short, the attorneys view must be objectively reasonable when it is
compared to existing law." (Citation omitted.)).
Under this objective standard, Defendants made a showing sufficient to support an
award of attorney fees as against Gillmor under Rule 11. However, the trial court denied
such sanctions on the following basis:
Whether the standard is subjective bad faith, as identified above, or
objective improper purpose, the record in this case does not provide a
sufficient basis to attribute either such motive to plaintiff... In the present
case, I see no evidence of a purpose to harass, delay, or impose unnecessary
cost. The purpose is clear - to obtain access that has not been obtained
through previously advanced theories.
(Ruling and Order, p. 6, R. 200.)
"In reviewing a trial court's imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, we first review
the trial court's factual findings under the 'clearly erroneous' standard." Pennington v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1998) (citing Barnard, 846 P.2d at 1235). "We
[then] review the trial court's conclusion that particular conduct violates rule 11 for
correctness." Id. at 938 (citing Barnard, 846 P.2d at 1235).
The trial court did not make any specific factual findings in relation to its Ruling
and Order. (Ruling and Order (R.195).) As such, there are no findings that this Court
can review under a clearly erroneous standard. See Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc.,
863 P.2d 59, 62, n. 6 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Indeed, the only supporting facts of record
267268v1
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were those set forth by Defendants in their Memorandum in Support of Defendants'
Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions, (R.l 14-130), and in their Supplemental Memorandum in
Support of Defendants' Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions, (R. 131-138). These factual
allegations were not disputed or even addressed by Gillmor in her responsive pleading.
(See Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions, (R.158164).) These undisputed facts established, inter alia,
•
An action was commenced in 1984 in the Third District Court in
Summit County by Gillmor's late husband, Charles F. Gillmor, against
David K. Richards and David K. Richards & Company, Inc., seeking an
injunction against Richards' interference with Gillmor's use of the Perdue
Creek and Neil Creek roads. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants'
Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions, R. 114-130, pp. 2-6, ^| 4. This action was
settled on the eve of trial in November, 1985, by way of a written
agreement granting Charles F. Gillmor easements for limited purposes
across the Perdue Creek road and portions of the Neil Creek road, and was
dismissed with prejudice. Id, ^5.
•
In 2001, Gillmor filed suit against Robin Macey, Ken Macey,
Family Link, and David K. Richards seeking, among other things,
injunctive relief prohibiting the defendants from interfering with her use of
the Perdue Creek and Neil Creek roads, and for a declaration of her rights
under the 1985 agreement. Id, ^| 6.
•
The 2001 litigation was tried in March, 2002. On September 24,
2002, Judge Hilder entered a judgment in that case, limiting Gilmore's
rights under the 1985 Agreement. On August 25, 2005, the Court of
Appeals affirmed as to all errors alleged by Gilmor (Gillmor v. Macey,
2005 UT App. 351) Id, ffif 7-10.
•
In 2007, Gillmor filed yet another suit, the underlying suit herein,
claiming for the first time that the Neil Creek and Perdue Creek roads had
acquired status as public thoroughfares, and that Gillmor was entitled to
private condemnation of the roadways pursuant to UCA § 78-34-1. Id., ^
13.
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•
In briefing the res judicata issue, Gillmor failed to cite a single case
in Utah or elsewhere that identified an "equitable exception" to the rule of
res judicata. Instead, Gillmor cited to language from a concurring opinion
in a U.S. Supreme Court case that quoted a dissent in an earlier U.S.
Supreme Court case. In both the case where the concurring opinion was
filed and the case where the dissenting opinion was filed, the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld the application of res judicata and in the case cited warned
against judicially-created exceptions to the rule. See Supplemental
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions, R.
131-138, pp. 2-4,^6
•
The Court heard argument on cross-motions on December 19, 2007.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court ruled that the doctrine of res
judicata barred Gillmor's claims because they could and therefore should
have been brought in the previous actions. Id., f 7.
•
In the course of the hearing, counsel for Gillmor acknowledged that
he had informed Gillmor that the Defendants had "a pretty good argument
in this case [on claim preclusion]." Id, ^ 8.
•
Counsel also acknowledged that Gillmor could have brought the two
claims asserted in this action in the 2001 Action. Id,.\ 9
•
Counsel for Gillmor repeatedly urged the Court not to grant
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on res judicata grounds because he would
simply find another plaintiff, not involved in the earlier cases, to bring the
road-by-use-claim. Counsel stated, "And frankly if the Court dismisses
. this, I'll bring it in somebody else's name as well." Id, f 10. Counsel also
argued that dismissing Gillmor's suit would not serve the purpose of
conserving judicial resources intended by res judicata because he would
find another plaintiff to bring the road-by-use claim, going so far as to say,
"I'll find somebody off the street" if necessary. Id, ^ 11. After the Court
had announced its ruling, counsel stated, "It's going to go up on appeal and
we'll find another plaintiff and we'll do it again." Id, % 12.
The instant action was Gillmor's third attempt to achieve the same, ill-fated result.
Each of these actions has involved the same parties, the same operative facts , and the
same outcome. The relevant case law did not change in the interim. Gillmor, cognizant
of all relevant facts prior to 2001, set forth no reason why she could not have alleged her
267268v1
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most recent claims in the prior actions. Indeed, she admitted that she could have done so.
See Id., ^| 9. Pleading these claims for the first time in a third proceeding is precisely the
type of piecemeal litigation of the same controversy that claim preclusion is meant to
prevent, and precisely the type of conduct that Rule 11 was meant to punish.
Such conduct supports an award of sanctions under Rule 11. Sanctions are
appropriate when a plaintiff seeks to avoid the effect of a final decision on the merits of
her claims by filing a new proceeding. See Schoney, 863 P.2d at 60-62 (Utah Ct. App.
1993). As set forth in Schoney:
Based on the trial court's review of the prior proceedings, it concluded the
attempt to go forward with the class action, in light of the complete
resolution of the matter eleven months prior, was "unconscionable and
beyond reason." The trial court noted that rule 11 was designed to prevent
this type of abuse of process and it imposed sanctions on Schoney.
Rule 11 requires an attorney to make a reasonable inquiry to assure that the
motion is "well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law,
and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose." See Utah R.Civ.P.
11. We agree with the trial court that Schoney's motion is unconscionable
and without reason and we hold that no proper purpose can be
justified by ignoring the rulings of foregoing tribunals. Accordingly, we
hold that the trial court's conclusion that rule 11 was violated is correct.
Id at 62 (emphasis added).
Similarly, mFransen v. Terps Ltd. Liability Co., 153 F.R.D. 655 (D. Colo. 1994),
Rule 11 sanctions were awarded based on a party's failure to explain why res judicata
would not apply.
Fransen offers no reasoned explanation of why the above law should not
apply. Fransen's only argument is there is no Colorado state law authority
expressly recognizing the Cohen exception. But as I noted, even if the
267268v1
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Cohen exception does not apply, other case law and commentary supports
my conclusion to give preclusive effect to the state court's ruling....
Fransen makes no attempt to distinguish these cases and cites no authority
[supporting his position]. Lacking any authority directly supporting his
position, he must at least articulate some rational basis why the state court's
adjudication, as a matter of sound policy, should not preclude relitigation of
the same issues. Fransen's only contention on this score is that he hoped I
would rule more favorably on his claim that he never legally became a
member of Terps than did the state court. A more blatant example of forum
shopping could not be found. Therefore, I grant Terps1 motion for sanctions
under Rule 11.
(citations omitted.) Id. at 660. See also Davis v. Helm, 2002 WL 1041314 (Tex.App.Houston [1 Dist.] 2002) (affirming award of attorney fees against the party where claims
were clearly barred by res judicata).
Gillmor filed her Complaint in complete disregard of, and with full knowledge of,
the effect of the prior two lawsuits addressing her right to use the roads at issue. As set
forth above, this Court has previously ruled that such efforts to avoid the results of
previous lawsuits should be sanctioned under Rule 11. Such a remedy is appropriate
here.
The purpose of a sanction levied against an offending party is "to deter repetition
of such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated," Utah R. Civ. P.
11(c)(2); see also Clark v. Booth, 821 P.2d 1146, 1148 (Utah 1991) (stating that
"[sanctions are imposed under Rule 11 as a disciplinary or punitive measure for
unacceptable conduct"). The need for such action is clear in this case. Accordingly,
Defendants respectfully submit that the trial court erred both factually and legally when it
determined that "the record in this case does not provide a sufficient basis to attribute
267268v1
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[improper purpose] to plaintiff." (Ruling and Order, p. 6; R.200.) Defendants request
that this Court reverse the trial court's determination as to this particular matter, hold that
sanctions are also appropriate as against Gillmor, and remand for a hearing to determine
the amount of such award. At a minimum, Defendants request that this ruling be
reversed and remanded to consider the undisputed facts of record in light of the correct,
objective standard set forth in Schoney.
III.

GILLMOR'S CLAIMS ARE ALSO BARRED BY JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL.
As Defendants argued in their Opening Brief, the Court can affirm the trial court's

judgment on the alternative ground of judicial estoppel. Gillmor concedes that most of
the elements for judicial estoppel are satisfied in this case. The elements of judicial
estoppel are: "(1) the prior and subsequent litigation involve the same parties or their
privies"; (2) "the prior and subsequent litigation involve the same subject matter"; (3)
"the prior position was 'successfully maintained'"; and (4) "the party seeking judicial
estoppel has relied upon the prior testimony and 'changed his position by reason of it.'"
Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2,1(11, 177 P.3d 600 (citation omitted). Gillmor does not
challenge the existence of the first, second or fourth elements. She thus acknowledges
that the "1984 Action,"1 the "2001 Action," and the present action involve the same
parties or their privies—Charles F.and Nadine Gillmor; that the same "subject matter,"

1

Gillmor characterizes the first action as the "1985 Action." Defendants have
characterized the first action as the "1984 Action," in their previous brief before this
Court. Both designations refer to the same action. As such, Defendants will continue to
use the designation "1984 Action" to refer to the first action.
267268v1
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i.e. the right to access over the roadways, was involved in all of the actions; and that the
Defendants relied upon the Gillmors' prior position that the roads would remain private,
changing their own positions by reason of the Gillmors' representations.
Of these four elements, Gillmor argues only that she never "successfully
maintained" her prior position that the roads would remain private. (Reply Brief of
Appellant and Cross-Appellee, p. 11.) Gillmor ftirther lobbies for a fifth element—"bad
faith"—to be added to judicial estoppel and, not surprisingly, argues that this element is
also lacking. Both of these arguments are entirely without merit. All of the elements of
judicial estoppel are met here, barring Gillmor's inconsistent legal positions.
A.

The Gillmors successfully maintained the prior position that the roads
would remain private by acquiring a settlement of the 1984 Action and
using the rights obtained from that settlement for over 20 years.

Nadine Gillmor argues that judicial estoppel does not apply because she and her
privy Charles F. Gillmor "lost the prior dispute between the parties." (Reply Brief of
Appellant and Cross-Appellee, p. 9.) Specifically, Nadine Gillmor argues that by entering
into the 1985 Agreement to settle the 1984 Action, Charles F. Gillmor gave up access
rights to his property. "Before the 1985 Agreement he [Charles F. Gillmor] had access
over two roads [Perdue and Neil Creek Roads] and after the agreement he was limited to
access only over one. Giving up something you had previously can hardly be called
'prevailing.'" (Id, p. 10.)
This is a gross mischaracterization of the facts. The central issue in the 1984
Action was access to the Gillmor property over the Richards property via the Perdue
267268vl
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Creek and Neil Creek Roads. Charles F. Gillmor initiated the 1984 Action, bringing
claims for prescriptive easement and irrevocable license and seeking an injunction
against Richards' alleged interference with Charles F. Gillmor's use of the roads.
(Complaint 1984 Action; Ex. 2 to R.31.) By bringing such claims, Charles F. Gillmor
acknowledged that, at the time, he had no legally enforceable, permanent or transferable
access rights over the Perdue Creek and Neil Creek Roads. At best, Charles F. Gillmor
had inchoate, disputed, and unperfected access; he filed the 1984 Action for the purpose
of making his use of the roads certain, legal, and transferable to his heirs. In response,
Richards disputed the existence of any access easement and brought counterclaims
against Charles F. Gillmor. (Ex. 3 to R.31; See also Ex. 4 to R.31, % 10.)
Rather than pursue their opposing claims through litigation, Richards and Charles
F. Gillmor settled their dispute through the 1985 Agreement. The 1985 Agreement was
mutually beneficial. As set forth in the recitals to the Agreement, it was entered into for
the mutual benefit of their respective Properties.... [I]n consideration of the mutual
covenants and agreements herein contained, and for other good and valuable
consideration, the receipt and adequacy of which are hereby acknowledgedf.1"
(1985 Agreement, p. 2; Ex. 3 to R.31 (emphasis added).) Both parties eliminated their
risk of an adverse judgment through litigation, obtaining a dismissal with prejudice of the
other's claims. (Ex. 3 to R.31.) The 1985 Agreement was thereafter attached as Exhibit
2

The Amended Complaint in the 1984 Action was actually against Richards, as
an individual, and Richards' corporation, David K. Richards & Co. For convenience,
both entities are referred to herein as "Richards."
267268vl
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A and incorporated into the Order and Judgment of Dismissal With Prejudice of the 1984
Action, serving as the judicially approved basis for the dismissal with prejudice. Id.
Most importantly, as a result of the 1985 Agreement, Charles F. Gillmor received
a portion of the recovery he sought in the 1984 Action—permanent easements for the
limited use the Perdue Creek Road and to a much lesser extent, the Neil Creek Road. In
order to acquire these easements, Charles F. Gillmor expressly represented and
covenanted that the roads would remain private:
Gillmor specifically covenants and agrees that he shall not
use the Easements, or allow the Easements to be used by his
invitees, agents, or employees in such a manner so as to
cause the Easements to become part of the public domain.
Gillmor specifically covenants and agrees that he shall not
allow the Gillmor Property to be used in such a manner so as
to subject the Easements to demands by the public for
access to any portion of the Gillmor property.

(1985 Agreement, ^f 2 (eniphasis added); Ex. 3 to R.31).
Given these facts, it is clear that Charles F. Gillmor "successfully maintained" his
position that the roads would remain private. In exchange for this covenant and
agreement, Charles F. Gillmor received a portion of the very access rights he was seeking
and a settlement of all claims against him. To the extent Charles F. Gillmor "lost" any
purported historical use of these roads through the 1985 Agreement, it was as a result of a
voluntary decision on his part to settle the case to avoid the possibility of losing the case
and potentially losing all use of the roads. Once the 1985 Agreement became accepted
and acted upon by the Court, both Charles F. Gillmor and his privies, including Nadine
267268vl

11

Gillmor, became estopped from taking an inconsistent position that the roads would
become public. See Correia v. DeSimone, 614 N.E.2d 1014, 1016 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993)
("The primary concern of the doctrine of judicial estoppel is to protect the integrity of the
judicial process. That concern would be ill served if those intimately involved in that
process, litigants, attorneys, and judges, could not rely on declarations of settlement
made to the court") (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); See Roxas v. Marcos, 969
P.2d 1209, 1242 n.19 (Hawaii 1998) (indicating that a position that has been "accepted
and acted upon by the court," judicially estops a party from "subsequently repudiating a
theory of action"); Commonwealth Ins. Co. v. Titan Tire Corp., 398 F.3d 879, 887 (7th
Cir. 2004) (observing "a favorable settlement. .. may be sufficient to show that the party
to be estopped prevailed in the prior case regardless of whether a judicial decision was
obtained."); Rissetto v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 604-05 (9th Cir.
1996) (concluding that "obtaining a favorable settlement is equivalent to winning a
judgment for purposes of applying judicial estoppel."); cf. Maker v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122,
129 (1980) (party who obtains a consent decree is a "prevailing party" no less than one
who obtains a judgment on the merits); cf. Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000

Defendants acknowledge that there is not a consensus in the federal circuits as
to whether judicial estoppel can result from a position taken in settlement of a lawsuit.
See Transamerica Leasing, Inc. v. Institute of London, 430 F.3d 1326, 1336 n. 8 (11th
Cir. 2005) (noting split in federal circuits on this issue). Here, however, the position at
issue was not merely contained in a private settlement agreement between the parties.
Rather, Charles F. Gillmor's position was actually accepted and acted upon by the trial
court in the 1984 Action insomuch as the 1985 Agreement served as the basis of, and was
made a part of, the judgment for dismissal with prejudice of the 1984 Action. The Order
and the 1985 Agreement became part of the land records of Summit County. (Ex. 3 to
267268vl
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UT 93^43, 16 P.3d 1214 (holding, for the final judgment prong of issue preclusion, "an
issue determined by stipulation rather than judicial resolution is binding in a subsequent
action if the parties manifested an intention to that effect.").
Nadine Gillmor no longer likes the limited access acquired by Charles F. Gillmor
through settlement of the 1984 Action. As such, she has initiated the present action to
expand this access, taking a position that directly undermines the representations upon
which the 1985 settlement was based. Her counsel has further indicated to the trial court
that he would try again with a new plaintiff if need be. (R. 110 at 27.) Allowing Nadine
Gillmor to undo a judicially approved settlement by taking new and contrary positions in
successive litigations is contrary to Utah's public policies favoring settlement and an end
to controversies. See Iron Head Const., Inc. v. Gurney, 2009 UT 25,^20, 628 Utah Adv.
Rep. 20 (observing that Utah courts "have long held that the public policy of Utah is to
encourage settlements." (citations omitted)); see, e.g., Logan City v. Utah Power & Light
Co., 16 P.2d 1097, 1100 (1932) ("The interests of society demand that there shall be a
termination to every controversy."). Judicial estoppel is an ideal vehicle for enforcing
these policies as it prevents parties or their privies "from playing fast and loose" with the
court by bringing successive suits based on inconsistent positions. 3d Const. & Dev.,
L.L.C v. Old Standard Life Ins. Co., 2005 UT App 307,111,117 P.3d 1082 (citations
omitted).

R.31.) Moreover, Utah's public policy favoring settlement and an end to controversies
favors the application of judicial estoppel to settlements.
267268vl
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Indeed, Nadine Gillmor's own actions make the application of judicial estoppel
particularly compelling in this case. Nadine Gillmor, as Charles F. Gillmor's wife,
reaped the benefits of the 1985 Agreement by using the access rights granted by this
Agreement for over twenty years. Nadine Gillmor brought and maintained the 2001
Action on rights purportedly stemming from the 1985 Agreement. Nadine Gillmor made
various representations in the 2001 Action that the relief she sought "would not harm the
public interest, because only private property is involved, in which the public has no
interest." (Second Amended Complaint, 2001 Action, ^[28; Ex. 1 to R.31.) That Nadine
Gillmor ultimately did not prevail on her arguments in the 2001 Action does not preclude
the application of judicial estoppel. Both prior to and following disposition of the 2001
Action, Nadine Gillmor used the roadways under rights flowing from the 1985
Agreement. She cannot now raise new claims that undermine the very warranties upon
which that 1985 Agreement was based and upon which the 1984 Action was settled.
Accordingly, the Gillmors successfully maintained their prior positions that the
roads would remain private, which were relied upon by the Defendants. All four of the
judicial estoppel elements are therefore satisfied, precluding Gillmor from maintaining
her present action based on public use.
B.

Bad faith is not an element of judicial estoppel; however, even if it
were, it is amply demonstrated in this case.

Gillmor also argues that judicial estoppel is not applicable in this case because the
Defendants have failed to establish the bad faith element. This argument is meritless.
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Contrary to Gillmor's argument, there are only four elements to judicial estoppel.
Although this Court has discussed bad faith as a fifth element, the Utah Supreme Court in
Orvis v. Johnson explicitly identified only four required elements for establishing judicial
estoppel under Utah law, and did not include bad faith among these elements. See Orvis,
2008 UT 2, at 1J11. In a footnote, the Orvis Court acknowledged that this Court's
jurisprudence added bad faith as an element, but by listing only four elements
notwithstanding this acknowledgment, the Orvis Court apparently did not adopt this
jurisprudence. See id. at ^[11 n.l; see also id. at ^12 n. 3 (observing in the body of the
opinion that "judicial estoppel only applies when all elements are met" and citing as
support, in footnote 3, Nebeker v. State Tax Comm% 2001 UT 74, \ 26, 34 P.3d 180, as
listing "the four elements of judicial estoppel.") (emphasis added)).
Nevertheless, even if bad faith were an element, there is ample evidence in the
record of bad faith by both Gillmor and her counsel in this case. See Deschamps v.
Pulley, 784 P.2d 471, 474 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("Courts applying agency principles
have consistently found that a client is bound by the acts of his attorney within the scope
of the attorney's authority." (citations omitted)).
When applied to judicial estoppel, this Court has held that bad faith requires some
type ofdeliberate "machination" that "subverts the integrity of judicial system," as
opposed to a circumstance where the "party's prior position was based on mere mistake
or inadvertence." See 3d Const. & Dev., LLC,

2005 UT App 307, atffifl1-12 (citations

omitted). There was no inadvertence or mistake behind Charles F. Gillmor's prior
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stipulation that the roads would remain private; this was one of the cornerstone promises
upon which the 1985 Agreement was based. Nor are mistake or inadvertence responsible
for Nadine Gillmor's sudden change of position; the switch is a tactical maneuver
intended to circumvent the settlement of the 1984 Action and deprive Richards of the
benefit of the 1985 Agreement.
The present action initiated by Gillmor requires her to take a position—the roads
are public—that is diametrically opposed to the position—the roads are private—she and
Charles F. Gillmor took in the prior actions. Charles F. Gillmor maintained his position
that the roads would remain private in the 1985 Agreement with full knowledge of the
importance of this issue to Richards, as evidenced by the inclusion of an express
provision to this effect in the Agreement. (1985 Agreement, ^ 2; Ex. 3 to R.31.) Nadine
Gillmor testified that when Charles F. Gillmor created the easement with Richards "he
didn't want [the road] to become public." (R.5; Transcript, R. 2014, March 4, 2002, p.
100:15-16 attached as addendum to Defendants' Opening Brief.) Nadine Gillmor's
counsel expressly acknowledged to the trial court that Gillmor did not make the publicuse assertion in the 2001 Action because it would have been "dicey" since Gillmor was
claiming in that action to have extensive private rights under the 1985 Agreement. (R.
110 at 40.) This type of deliberate reversal based on the exigencies of the moment is the
essence of bad faith. For Gillmor to use the easements created by the 1985 Agreement
for two decades and now knowingly and deliberately take a position that undermines the
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very basis upon which Richards granted those easements is to defraud Richards. Judicial
estoppel precludes such behavior.
CONCLUSION
The trial court' grant of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and its award of sanctions
against Gillmor's counsel under Rule 11(b)(2) should be affirmed. The trial court's
denial of sanctions against Gillmor personally and her counsel under Rule 11(b)(1)
should be reversed and the case remanded for a determination and award of sanctions
under U.R.Civ.P. 11(b)(1) and U.R.App.P. 33(b).
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